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Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts*
Abstract
Frank Jackson’s knowledge	argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by 
Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves 
non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical 
terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of 
the phenomenal	concept	strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master	argument, 
a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal 
concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the master argument does not advance the de-
bate between the supporters of the anti-physicalist arguments and those of the phenomenal 
concept strategy.
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Physicalists	 have	 spelled	 out	 this	 notion	 of	










intuitions	 concerning	 a	 conceptual	 distinction	between	qualia	 and	physical	
properties	or	properties	depending	on	these	latter	properties.	These	arguments	
























a posteriori	physicalist	might	provide.5	The	conclusion	of	 the	 first	horn	of	
this	dilemma	is	that	phenomenal	concepts	cannot	account	for	our	epistemic	
situation	in	relation	to	qualia	when	we	think	about	them	from	the	first-person	



























2. The phenomenal concept strategy










Frank	 Jackson’s	knowledge	argument	 against	physicalism	goes	as	 follows.	






















For	 the	 knowledge	 argument,	 see	 Jackson	






Amongst	 recent	 proposals,	 see	 Carruthers	
2000,	 Papineau	 2002,	 Perry	 2001,	 and	 Tye	
2000,	although	Tye	has	recanted	in	Tye	2009.
4




























The	phenomenal	 concept	 strategy	 is	 also	 used	 to	 resist	 conceivability	 argu-













it	is	metaphysically	possible	that	P	is	true	and	Q is	false. This	conclusion is	
then	taken	to	be	damaging	to	physicalism	because	physicalists	would	admit	
that	P	should	imply	Q as	a	matter	of	metaphysical	necessity.11

















































The	 elaboration	 of	 different	 physicalist	 accounts	 of	 phenomenal	 concepts	

















The	 conclusion	 that	 physicalists	 should	 ac-
cept	 that	 psychophysical	 identifications	 are	
necessary	was	part	of	Kripke’s	conceivability	
arguments	 targeted	against	 the	early	 identity	
theorists	of	the	1950s,	such	as	J.	J.	C.	Smart	
and	U.	T.	 Place,	 who	maintained	 that	 these	
identifications	 were	 contingent.	 Nowadays,	
many	physicalists	accept	that	what	they	take	
to	 be	 the	 fundamental	 relation	 between	 the	
physical	 and	 the	 mental	 is	 metaphysically	
necessary,	see	Papineau	2002,	pp.	75–76.
12
Phenomenal	 concepts	 are	 taken	 to	 be:	 rec-
ognitional	 concepts,	 in	 Loar	 1990	 and	 Car-
ruthers	2004;	concepts	that	play	very	distinct	
conceptual	 roles	 from	physical	 concepts	be-
cause	are	associated	to	very	different	mental	
faculties,	in	Hill	1997	and	Hill	and	McLaugh-
lin	 B.	 1999;	 indexical	 concepts	 involving	 a	
demonstrative	 reference	 to	 physical	 proper-























































4. A charge of equivocation
It	has	been	argued	that	Chalmers’s	dilemma	is	based	on	an	equivocation	in	the	
use	of	the	description	C.16	This	equivocation	is	revealed	by	using	what	could	
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To	illustrate	these	two	ways	of	thinking	let	us	introduce	a	convention.	Phe-
nomenal	concepts	will	be	 indicated	with	 letters	 in	bold	while	 the	qualia	 to	
which	they	refer	with	letters	in	italics.	So,	with	B we refer	to	a	phenomenal	
concept	and	with	B to	a	quale	 to	which	 the	phenomenal	concept	 indicated	
with	B	 refers. With	 the	 first-personal mode of presentation	of	phenomenal	
concepts,	a	certain	subject	thinks	about	concept	B as	the	phenomenal	concept	
of	quale	B, and	she	thinks	about	this	quale	B	by using the	phenomenal	concept	
B. On	the	other	hand,	with	the	third-personal mode of presentation	of	phe-
nomenal	concepts,	the	subject	thinks	about	B as	the	phenomenal	concept	re-

































requirement	 of	 “topic-neutrality”.18	 Without	 engaging	 with	 this	 response,	
15
This	 account	 of	 reductive	 explanation	 is	
given	in	Chalmers	2006,	and	also	in	Jackson	
1994b.	 See,	 for	 objections,	 Block	 and	 Stal-
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here	it	is	enough	to	note	that	Chalmers’s	requirement	appears,	at	least	prima 

















that	 the	 phenomenal	 concept	 strategy	 blocks	 the	 conceivability	 arguments	
based	on	zombies,	offers	a	mode	of	presentation	of	C. This	way	of	thinking	
can	be	called	an	explanatory mode of presentation, from	now	on	indicated	as	
EMP. The EMP	enables	us	to	think	about C as	concerning:	the	psychologi-
cal,	intentional,	epistemic	features	in	virtue	of	which	a	physical	property	N	is	
given	to	a	subject	in a way that	offers	to	her	grounds	for	conceiving	that	N	is	
not	given	in	the	same way	to	her	physical	duplicate.






































































Q)	 by	 employing	 phenomenal	 concepts and the EMP	 in	 one	 single	 act	 of	
conceiving.	In	fact,	this	would	amount	to	conceiving	a	zombie	that	satisfies	a	












































they	 should	 also	be	 able	 to	 accommodate	phenomenal	 concepts.	However,	
clearly,	two	central	issues	are	left	open.
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Luca Malatesti
Misliti o fenomenalnim pojmovima
Sažetak
Argument	znanja	Francka Jacksona i razni argumenti zamislivosti, koje zagovaraju Saul Krip-
ke, David Chalmers i Joseph Levine, zaključuju da svijest uključuje ne-fizikalna svojstva ili 
svojstva koje se ne mogu redukcionistički objasniti fizikalnim terminima. Neki fizikalisti su pru-
žili odgovor na ove prigovore pomoću raznih verzija strategije	fenomenalnih	pojmova. David 
Chalmers je odgovorio s glavnim	argumentom, zaključivanjem koje bi, ako je uspješno, pot-
kopalo bilo koju razložnu verziju strategije fenomenalnih pojmova. U ovom radu tvrdim da 
glavni argument ne pridonosi raspravi između zagovaratelja anti-fizikalističkih argumenata i 





Denken über phänomenale Begriffe
Zusammenfassung
Frank Jacksons Wissensargument sowie diverse Argumente der Vorstellbarkeit – vorgebracht 
seitens Saul Kripke, David Chalmers und Joseph Levine – schlussfolgern, das Bewusstsein 
schließe nichtphysikalische Wesenszüge ein bzw. jene, die sich reduktionistisch vermöge der 
physikalischen Termini nicht erklären lassen. Die einen und die anderen Physikalisten respondi-
erten auf diese Einwendungen unter Zuhilfenahme von verschiedenartigen Versionen der Stra-
tegie	der	phänomenalen	Begriffe. David Chalmers antwortete mit dem Hauptargument, einer 
Begründung, die, falls erfolgreich, eine jede vernünftige Version der Strategie der phänome-
nalen Begriffe untergraben würde. In diesem Paper erachte ich, das Hauptargument fördere 
keine Debatte zwischen den Anhängern der antiphysikalistischen Argumente und denjenigen 
der Strategie der phänomenalen Begriffe.
Schlüsselwörter
Bewusstsein,	Qualia,	 Zombies,	A-posteriori-Physikalismus,	 Strategie	 der	 phänomenalen	 Begriffe,	
David	Chalmers’	Hauptargument
Luca Malatesti
Réfléchir sur les concepts phénoménaux
Résumé
L’argument	de	la	connaissance de Frank Jackson ainsi que les différents arguments de la con-
cevabilité, avancés par Saul Kripke, David Chalmers et Joseph Levine, concluent que la con-
science implique des propriétés non-physiques ou des propriétés ne pouvant être expliquées en 
termes physiques. Certains physicalistes ont répondu à ces objections au moyen de différentes 
versions de la stratégie	des	concepts	phénoménaux. David Chalmers a répliqué par le maître	
argument, un raisonnement qui, en cas de réussite, saperait toute version raisonnable de la stra-
tégie des concepts phénoménaux. Dans cet article, j’affirme que le maître argument n’avance 
pas le débat entre les partisans des arguments anti-physicalistes et ceux de la stratégie des 
concepts phénoménaux.
Mots-clés
Conscience,	qualia,	zombies,	physicalisme	a	posteriori,	stratégie	des	concepts	phénoménaux,	maître	
argument	de	David	Chalmers
